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PANDEMICS AND PANDEMONIUM:  




It has long been accepted that the provinces have general jurisdiction over 
healthcare. But many aspects of public health – the branch concerned 
with the welfare of populations – can be argued to lend themselves to 
federal involvement. This was recently illustrated in 2003 when SARS, 
a previously unknown disease, arrived in Toronto and wreaked havoc 
on the local public health system. The epidemic highlighted numerous 
shortcomings within Ontario’s system and caused us to question those 
of the other provinces. Not surprisingly, the federal government quickly 
came under heavy pressure to take leadership and action in respect of 
public health. In response, we received the Public Health Agency of 
Canada (PHAC).  However, the agency’s full mandate is unclear at the 
time of this paper, and as yet it is without an enabling statute. 
This article is concerned with the extent, if any, of the 
constitutional jurisdiction for federal involvement in public health.  It will 
use hypothetical federal legislation regarding infectious disease control 
to evaluate the possible heads of power for such involvement: Peace, 
Order and Good Government; Criminal Law; the Spending Power; 
and Quarantine and Marine Hospitals.  The author will then review 
the long-held bases for provincial jurisdiction: Municipal Institutions; 
Hospitals; Property and Civil Rights; and Matters of a Local or Private 
Nature.  Throughout the paper, the author makes reference to public 
health’s constant struggle to balance individual rights with the welfare 
of the larger community.  The author observes that there is a great deal 
of variation among the provinces in how they have chosen to balance 
† Keri Gammon is a third year law student at Dalhousie Law School. She will be 
clerking at the BC Court of Appeal in 2006 and will complete her articles with Fasken 
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these interests, and suggests that this variation can be attributed to 
the societal and cultural differences among the provinces. The author 
concludes by asserting that when a subject matter not only implicates 
provincial heads of power but plays heavily upon local values, there 
is excellent reason to leave primary jurisdiction with the provinces in 
all but extreme cases, despite the arguments which could be made for 
federal jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in the Canadian Journal of Public Health, the claim is 
made that:
[A] government’s fundamental role is to preserve the security of its 
citizenry, and as such it must be structured in a way that ensures that 
the health of its population is protected.1 
But, in a federal state such as ours, which level of government is to act 
for this purpose? If this fundamental role applies to both the provincial 
and federal governments, what are the constitutional sources of power 
that  grant  the  authority  needed  to  fulfil  that  role?  And  if  jurisdiction  is  
to be shared between these two levels of government, how should it be 
assigned so as to respect federalism? Viewed through the lens of public 
health, these questions are as increasingly relevant as they are evasive 
of resolution. 
Although a province’s receipt of federal funding for healthcare is 
contingent upon its compliance with the federal Canada Health Act,2 
provinces have retained wide discretion over the provision of health-
care  and  health  services.  The  provinces  enjoy  jurisdiction  over  health  
insurance programs,3 the regulation of health professionals,4 hospitals 
and similar institutions,5 and the provision (and in some cases, enforce-
ment) of treatment.6 The provincial legislative landscape includes men-
tal health, the protection and management of health information, hospi-
tals, nursing homes and other care facilities, and the focus of this article, 
1  Kumanan Wilson, “The complexities of multi-level governance in public health” (2004) 
95(6) Can. J. Public Health 409 at 409. 
2  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [Canada Health Act].
3  Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 646, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 
577 [Eldridge cited to S.C.R.].
4  See Linette McNamara, Erin Nelson & Brent Windwick, “Regulation of Health 
Care  Professionals”  in  Jocelyn  Downie,  Timothy  Caulfield  &  Colleen  M.  Flood,  eds.,  
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at 55.
5  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 
II, No. 5 at s. 92(7) [Constitution Act].
6  See e.g. Schneider v. British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, 139 D.L.R. (3d) 417 
[Schneider cited to S.C.R.]; Fawcett v. Ontario (A.G.), [1964] S.C.R. 625, 45 D.L.R. 
(2d) 579 [Fawcett cited to S.C.R.].
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public health. This discussion will centre on public health legislation 
addressing the management and control of infectious disease which, 
until now, has been left to the provinces and has never been seriously 
questioned from a constitutional division of powers perspective.7 
However, a shift may be underway. In March 2003, a previously 
unknown respiratory illness appeared in Toronto and quickly began 
to terrorize both the public and the public health system.8 The illness 
was soon coined “SARS,” or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. The 
months that followed saw 44 deaths and 438 probable and suspect cases 
of the disease in Canada.9  Remarkably,  the  outbreak  remained  confined  
within Ontario. However, the chaos it created within that province high-
lighted the larger, more systemic weaknesses of public health in Canada 
generally. For example, Ontario’s experience brought to light problems 
such as:
[A] lack of surge capacity in the clinical and public health systems; 
difficulties   with   timely   access   to   laboratory   testing   and   results;;  
absence of protocols for data or information sharing among levels 
of government; uncertainties about data ownership; inadequate 
capacity for epidemiologic investigation of the outbreak; lack of 
coordinated  business  processes  across  institutions  and  jurisdictions  
for outbreak management and emergency response; inadequacies 
in institutional outbreak management protocols, infection control, 
and infectious disease surveillance; and weak links between public 
health and the personal health services system, including primary 
care, institutions, and home care.10
As observed by the National Advisory Committee on SARS and 
Public Health, it is likely that other provinces would have faced similar 
7  Although there has been at least one Charter challenge to such legislation. See 
Toronto  (City,  Medical  Officer  of  Health)  v.  Deakin, [2002] O.J. No. 2777 (QL) 
(challenging the detention and treatment provisions of Ontario’s Health Protection 
and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-7).
8  See especially The National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, 
“Learning from SARS - Renewal of Public Health in Canada” (Ottawa: Health 
Canada, October 2003) [Learning from SARS]; World Health Organization, 
Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response (CSR), “Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS),” online: <http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en>.
9  Learning from SARS, ibid. at 20.
10  Ibid. at 1.
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issues had the outbreak not been contained.11 Had the epidemic spread, 
these intra-provincial shortcomings would have been greatly compound-
ed  by  numerous  inter-­jurisdictional  problems.  These  problems  include  
uncertainty as to federal and provincial responsibilities during a health 
crisis and the inadequate means of collaborative decision-making and 
action among the provinces.12
In response to these problems, considerable pressure was placed 
upon the federal government to create a national public health agency13 
and  by  September  2004,  the  agency’s  Chief  Public  Health  Officer  had  
been appointed.14 One year earlier at the Conference of Federal, Provin-
cial and Territorial (FPT) Ministers of Health, the participants agreed 
upon   the   necessity   of   inter-­jurisdictional   collaboration   in   enhancing  
the national public health infrastructure, and thus began the blueprint 
for the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network (PCPHN).15 Although the 
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is currently without an ena-
bling statute16 and the PCPHN is still in its early stages, it is clear that 
the PCPHN was created to enable truly national consultation and en-
gagement with regard to activities of the PHAC.17 However, the federal 
11  Ibid. at 20.
12  Ibid. at 19.
13  See e.g. Learning from SARS, supra note 8; The Honourable Mr. Justice Archie 
Campbell, “The SARS Commission Interim Report, SARS and Public Health in 
Ontario” (April 15, 2004) [Campbell Commission, Interim Report].
14  Public Health Agency of Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada 
Appoints  First  Chief  Public  Health  Officer  to  Head  Public  Health  Agency  Of  
Canada” (24 September 2004), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-
rp/2004/phac_nr_e.html>.
15  Health Canada, News Release, “Conference of Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Ministers of Health Halifax, Nova Scotia - September 4, 2003” (4 September 2003), 
online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2003/2003_67_e.html>.
16  Bill C-75, An Act respecting the establishment of the Public Health Agency of 
Canada and amending certain Acts,  1st  Sess.,  38th  Parl.,  2004-­2005  received  its  first  
reading on November 16, 2005 but the session ended before the bill completed the 
legislative process.
17     Health  Canada,  “Frequently  asked  questions:  Chief  Public  Health  Officer  of  
Canada/Public Health Agency of Canada” (September 2004), online: <http://www.
hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2004/2004_47bk3_e.html>; Working Group on a 
Public Health Agency for Canada, “Report: A Public Health Agency for Canada” 
(2004), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/phawg-aspgt-noseworthy/
index.html#toc>.   
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status of the Agency raises the question as to Parliament’s constitutional 
jurisdiction  over  public  health.  With   respect   to   the  agency’s  potential  
role in facilitating inter-provincial cooperation, the same question arises 
and  the  boundaries  of  each  level  of  government’s  jurisdiction  must  be  
considered. 
For the purposes of this discussion, a distinction is made between: 
(a) public health activities concerned primarily with the prevention and 
treatment of disease at the individual level, with a view to the welfare 
of both individuals and the public at large; and (b) the regulation of cer-
tain activities and industries with a view to protecting the public from 
broad-based harms such as radiation, environmental pollution, tobacco, 
and  unsafe  food  and  drugs.  The  first  of  these  is  addressed  almost  exclu-
sively by provincial public health statutes, while the second has been 
dealt with by both levels of government and, not surprisingly, has been 
the  source  of  much  constitutional  litigation.  It  is  the  first  conception  of  
public health with which this article is concerned.
In this article I will illustrate that the unique qualities of public 
health demand a complex, and sometimes unusual, division of powers 
analysis. Furthermore, I will argue that this uniqueness poses several 
challenges to a traditional conception of federalism. Given that the driv-
ing force behind current federal efforts in public health is the issue of 
infectious diseases,18 this topic will be my main focus.  As such, I will 
employ hypothetical federal legislation respecting disease management 
and control. Following a comprehensive analysis of potential sources of 
federal power to support such legislation, there will be a brief discussion 
of  the  basis  for  the  virtually  unquestioned  provincial  jurisdiction  over  
matters  of  health.  The  article  concludes  with  the  finding  that,  notwith-
standing   the   strong   constitutional   arguments   for   federal   jurisdiction,  
there are equally important yet unwritten principles that are only con-
sistent with the provinces retaining primary responsibility over public 
health and infectious disease control.
18     The  term  “infectious  disease”  is  perhaps  best  defined  by  way  of  example,  as  
it encompasses a wide variety of infections with little in common but for their 
communicable nature. Illustrations of these diseases include tuberculosis, HIV, 
smallpox and measles; sexually transmitted infections such as gonorrhoea and 
chlamydia; and also more commonplace infections such as chickenpox and 
influenza.  The  terms  “infectious”  and  “communicable”  will  be  used  interchangeably  
in this article, consistent with their use in provincial public health legislation.
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I. THE NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH JURISDICTION 
Whereas  constitutional   jurisdiction  over  health  has  been  the  theme  of  
considerable academic discourse19   and   judicial   comment,20 it was not 
included  as  a  distinct  subject  matter  capable  of  federal  or  provincial  as-
signment in 1867. This is likely because health may have been assumed 
to be a personal matter as between an individual and her doctor, attract-
ing the responsibility of the provinces only in the event of an emergency 
and otherwise leaving each municipality to address issues such as sani-
tation and disease control.21  
19  See e.g. M. Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health in Canada” (2000) 
8 Health L.J. 95 [Jackman]; André Braën, “Discussion Paper No. 2: Health and the 
Distribution of Powers in Canada” (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health 
Care in Canada, July 2002) [Braën]; D. Gibson, “The Canada Health Act and the 
Constitution” (1996) Health L.J. 1. Public health has received considerably less 
attention; see e.g. “Chapter 9: Some Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by SARS and 
Infectious Diseases in Canada”, in Learning from SARS, supra note 8; R.T. McKall, 
“Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Public Health” (1976) 6 Man. L. J. 317.  
20  See e.g. Eldridge, supra note 3 (provision of services); Schneider, supra note 
6 (detention and treatment of heroin addicts); Fawcett, supra note 6 (mental health 
legislation). As early as 1886, the division of powers with respect to health was 
judicially  considered;;  interestingly  enough,  it  was  in  the  context  of  public  health:  
Rinfret v. Pope, [1886] 12 Q L.R. 303 (Que. CA). 
21  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Dominion-­Provincial  Relations, Book 
II: Recommendations (Ottawa, E. Cloutier, Queen’s Printer, 1940) at 32-35 
[Rowell-Sirois Report]. In explaining the relative inattention given to health in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, the Commission wrote the following:
In 1867 the administration of public health was still in a very 
primitive stage, the assumption being that health was a private 
matter and state assistance to protect or improve the health of the 
citizen was highly exceptional and tolerable only in emergencies 
such as epidemics, or for purposes of ensuring elementary sanitation 
in urban communities. Such public health activities as the state did 
undertake were almost wholly a function of local and municipal 
governments. It is not strange, therefore, that the British North 
America   Act   does   not   expressly   allocate   jurisdiction   in   public  
health, except that marine hospitals and quarantine (presumably 
ship quarantine) were assigned to the Dominion, while the province 
was  given  jurisdiction  over  other  hospitals,  asylums,  charities  and  
eleemosynary  institutions.  But  the  province  was  assigned  jurisdiction  
over “generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in 
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While it remains true that public health is addressed at the municipal 
and provincial levels, the urbanization and economic interdependence 
of modern Canada creates novel threats to health and brands of public 
health emergencies of previously unimaginable scope. It is no longer 
sufficient  to  treat  public  health  as  if  it  were  capable  of  the  compartmen-
talization that applied in 1867. Not only do contemporary threats such 
as  SARS,  West  Nile  Virus,  pandemic  flu   (such  as   the  Avian  Flu)  and  
the spectre of bioterrorism suggest the desirability of a more national 
approach to public health, in some instances federal action may be con-
stitutionally required. 
Upon  first  inspection,  a  division  of  powers  analysis  of  public  health  
may present as purely academic. Indeed, if the recent proclamations22 
of commitment to federal-provincial cooperation are any indication, 
perhaps we are unlikely to see any government-initiated constitutional 
challenges in this area. At this point, however, it is important to accu-
rately   identify   the   constitutional   significance   of   cooperation   between  
governments.  It  has  been  held,  for  example,  that  constitutional  jurisdic-
tion cannot be obtained by a consensual transfer from one government 
to another.23 
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has also consistently al-
luded to the relevance and value of cooperation between the federal and 
provincial governments. For example, in Kitkatla Band v. British Co-
lumbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture)24 the federal 
Attorney General intervened in support of the province, arguing that the 
impugned provincial legislation was in fact intra vires. Writing for the 
Court, LeBel J. held that:
the Province”, and it is probable that this power was deemed to 
cover health matters, while the power over “municipal institutions” 
provided a convenient means for dealing with such matters.
22  Health Canada, News Release, “Ministers of Health Announce Creation of the 
Pan-Canadian Public Health Network and Name Council Membership” (22 April 
2005), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2005/2005_26_e.html>; 
Health Canada, News Release, “A 10-year plan to strengthen health care” (16 
September 2004), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/
fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/index_e.html>.
23  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1950] 4 D.L.R. 
369, [1951] S.C.R. 31 at 40. 
24  [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Kitkatla cited to S.C.R.].
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[W]hile this is not determinative of the issue…it does invite the Court 
to  exercise  caution  before  it  finds  that  the  impugned  provisions  of  
the Act are ultra vires the province.25 
Thus, a cooperative atmosphere between the federal and provincial gov-
ernments  will  not  preclude  a  finding  that  one  has  subject  matter  jurisdic-
tion to the exclusion of the other, but it will be one factor for considera-
tion.
The above points are particularly important when we look to the 
identities of potential constitutional litigants. Experience has shown 
that it is more likely that a division of powers analysis will arise in the 
context of a larger rights-based challenge to public health legislation 
brought by an individual, rather than an inter-governmental challenge. 
In such a case, inter-governmental cooperation is likely to be irrelevant 
to the challenger, and the division of powers issue will inevitably be 
before the court. 
In so far as the PHAC may offer logistical support and additional 
resources for provincial efforts, federal leadership in public health is 
relatively unproblematic from a division of powers perspective. How-
ever, at present, the full scope of the Agency’s activities remains unar-
ticulated and, possibly, undecided. Additionally, there is the federalism-
inspired risk that attempts to secure federal-provincial cooperation will 
be unsuccessful, despite the work of the PCPHN.26 Such a failure might 
provide an incentive for a more assertive – in other words, legislative 
– approach by the federal government. 
At this point in the discussion it becomes crucial to appreciate that 
among   the   thirteen   provincial   and   territorial   jurisdictions   in   Canada,  
25  Ibid.  at  180.  This  practice  was  recently  confirmed  in  Rothmans, Benson & 
Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 411. 
26     While  cooperative  efforts  might  fail  where  one  or  more  jurisdictions  cannot  
agree, perhaps the more prominent concerns should be those of timeliness and 
inaction. For example, the 1999 Auditor General’s report called for the creation of a 
national public health surveillance network, to be led by Health Canada. Three years 
later, the 2002 Report observed that limited progress had been made on most areas of 
the  project,  including  the  creation  of  data-­sharing  agreements  with  the  provinces.  See  
Auditor General of Canada, 1999 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 
14  —  National  Health  Surveillance:  Diseases  and  Injuries,”  online:  <http://www.oag-­
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9914ce.html>; Auditor General of Canada, 2002 
Status Report, “Health Canada — National Health Surveillance,” online: <http://
www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20020902ce.html>.
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there exist vastly different approaches to numerous elements of public 
health,27  and  to  a  certain  extent  these  variations  likely  reflect  important  
differences in history and culture between the provinces. Should Parlia-
ment’s  leadership  be  perceived  as  an  intrusion  into  provincial  jurisdic-
tion, or in the event that a province is unwilling to yield on a particular 
issue, public health may present a veritable constitutional battleground. 
Furthermore, as stated above, it is always open for an individual litigant 
to question the constitutionality of one government’s legislation in the 
context of a larger action. Regardless of how the challenge arises, a 
court will have to ascertain the constitutional validity of an impugned 
law for compliance with the division of powers. 
1. Public Health as a Subject Matter
Public health can be distinguished from health, generally, on the basis 
of their respective ‘clients’. While health (or ‘medicine’) focuses on 
individuals, public health is concerned with the communal well-being. 
This  distinction  is  somewhat  superficial  as  individual  health  has  obvi-
ous implications for the collective interest, and the collective well-be-
ing represents the aggregate health status of individuals. However, the 
distinction  becomes  clearer  when  we   look   to   the   specific  example  of  
infectious disease. An infection begins at the level of the individual, 
but the threat of widespread transmission requires that broader-based 
measures be taken to prevent, manage and control that disease from 
causing greater harm within the community. The inherently public na-
ture of infectious disease certainly creates a strong incentive for federal 
involvement; however, the corresponding provincial interest in respect 
of individual health and protecting their own communities is both sup-
ported by logic and manifested in long-standing provincial public health 
legislation and practice. 
Each province currently employs a variety of public health practices 
as set out in their respective statutes and as implemented by regional 
27  See e.g. Elaine Gibson, “Provincial/Territorial Public Health and Emergency 
Laws” (Presentation to Health Canada’s Public Health Workshop on Quarantine and 
Legal Preparedness for Public Health Emergency, September 2004) [unpublished]; 
Jennifer L. Schulz, “Public Health Law” in Barney Sneiderman, John C. Irvine & 
Philip H. Osborne, Canadian Medical Law: An Introduction for Physicians, Nurses 
and other Health Care Professionals, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) [Schulz]. 
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health authorities.28 With respect to infectious disease, every province 
requires its physicians to report to their public health authority any cases 
of enumerated infectious diseases. In some provinces, this duty extends 
to others such as school teachers, and still other provinces require re-
porting by any individual who suspects the presence of an infectious 
disease in another person. Many provinces require that an infected in-
dividual’s  familial  and  sexual  contacts  be  notified  in  respect  of  certain  
diseases, while others leave reporting to the discretion of the physician 
or are altogether silent on the matter. Once the presence of disease has 
been  confirmed,  the  imposition  of  treatment  will  depend  upon  the  prov-
ince:  treatment  may  be  ordered  by  a  medical  health  officer  acting  alone  
or as supported by a court order, or treatment may be at the election 
of the individual provided that they take necessary precautions such as 
isolation  to  minimize  the  risk  of  infecting  others.  Confidentiality  pro-
visions with respect to an individual’s health status may afford nearly 
impermeable protections in some provinces while in others identifying 
personal information can be released to the public where it is believed 
necessary for the protection of the public.
This overview of public health activities is not intended to be ex-
haustive, but rather to provide the reader with a sense of current pro-
vincial powers and practices. Additionally, it points to the existence of 
gaps and inconsistencies as between the provinces in terms of how they 
manage disease within their own boundaries. These differences, while 
compatible with federalist principles,29 may attract the scrutiny of those 
contemplating federal public health initiatives. As such, they will in-
form the hypothetical legislation and provide the starting point for a 
division of powers analysis. 
28  See generally Schulz, ibid., for the examples discussed here.
29  See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2005 Student Edition 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at ss. 52.9(d), 52.16 [Hogg]. As noted by Hogg, there is no 
constitutional requirement for uniform legislation among the provinces. Differential 
treatment that is only the result of legislative variation among the provinces will not 
amount to a violation of equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter, as this 
would run contrary to the very notion of federalism.
12 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
2. The Hypothetical Legislation
This  discussion  will  employ  fictitious  yet  plausible  federal   legislation  
respecting highly communicable diseases. It imagines that in anticipa-
tion of newly emerging (or re-emerging) infectious diseases, Parliament 
has created a Public Health Protection Act. This umbrella legislation 
authorizes the Minister of Health, using criteria enumerated in the stat-
ute, to identify those infectious diseases that pose a threat to the national 
public health and to impose particular measures for their prevention and 
control. The application of the Act would be limited to virulent dis-
eases with the potential to spread widely, such as SARS or the diseases 
addressed by the World Health Organization’s International Health 
Regulations.30 It may also include less-threatening diseases appearing 
in  unusual  clinical  forms  and/or  frequency,  such  as  a  pandemic  flu  or  
a particular strain of infectious disease that has become resistant to all 
available antibiotics. 
Once a disease has been recognized by the Minister, the preventa-
tive and responsive measures would be quite broad and may include: 
compulsory vaccination, mandatory reporting by the infected individ-
ual and others, obligatory testing for exposed individuals, the compul-
sion of personal health information as between the provinces and the 
PHAC, quarantine and isolation provisions and mandatory treatment. 
The PHAC, with the assistance of the PCPHN, would be responsible 
for advising the Minister on the development of these criteria and re-
sponse measures and additionally, would make recommendations for a 
cooperative inter-governmental approach to infectious disease manage-
ment.31  Finally,  the  use  of  penalties  including  fines  and,  in  some  cases,  
30  World Health Organization, “International Health Regulations (1969),” (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2003) [IHRs]. These regulations apply to cholera, plague 
and yellow fever. In May 2005, the World Health Organization approved a new set of 
regulations intended to address a wider variety of international public health threats, 
but they are not yet in force: see World Health Organization, News Release, “World 
Health Assembly adopts new International Health Regulations” (23 May 2005), 
online: <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr_wha03/en/index.
html>.
31     In  these  respects,  the  fictitious  Act would resemble the structure of the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, and its creation of a National 
Advisory Committee for the purpose of assisting the Minister of the Environment 
in  making  regulations  with  respect  to  the  identification,  control  and  management  of  
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imprisonment, would be available for the purposes of securing compli-
ance with the Act.32
II. LOCATING FEDERAL PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION WITHIN 
THE DIVISION OF POWERS
This section will evaluate the following heads of power as possible 
sources  of  jurisdiction  for  federal  public  health  legislation:  Peace,  Order  
and Good Government, the Criminal Law, the Spending Power, and the 
authority over Quarantine and Marine Hospitals. While there are other 
heads of power which may assist in supporting public health activities, 
such as Trade and Commerce33 or the Treaty-Making power,34 neither 
would provide an adequate basis for enacting a statute such as the Pub-
lic Health Protection Act.
1. Peace, Order and Good Government
The residual power to legislate in relation to “peace, order and good 
government” (hereinafter POGG) was given to Parliament by the pre-
amble of s. 91 of the Constitution Act.35 Due to its residual nature, this 
power is generally reserved for consideration until the more explicit 
federal heads of power have been examined. However, it will be con-
sidered  first  here  as  the  discussion  will  provide  a  better  foundation  from  
which to assess the other possible sources of power.  
The   jurisprudence   recognizes   two   dimensions   of   POGG:   the  Na-
tional Concern branch and the Emergency branch.36 Both will be dis-
cussed  briefly  and  then  examined  in  the  context  of  public  health.
toxic substances. 
32  This is consistent with provincial public health legislation, which generally 
creates numerous offences and corresponding penalties. The frequency with 
which these offences are prosecuted, however, is unknown and is likely worthy of 
scepticism.
33  Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(2).
34     As  confirmed  in  Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication [1932] A.C. 
304, 2 D.L.R. 81.
35  Constitution Act, supra note 5.
36  See especially R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 233 D.L.R. 
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i. The National Concern Branch
In R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.,37  the  Supreme  Court  confirmed  
the existence of the National Concern branch of POGG. The diverse 
range of topics upheld under this branch includes aeronautics,38 the 
creation of a national capital region,39 marine pollution,40 and atomic 
energy.41 
The Court in Crown Zellerbach provided the factors to be consid-
ered in applying the doctrine: 
For a matter to qualify as a matter of National Concern in either 
sense it must have a singleness, distinctiveness, and indivisibility 
that distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a 
scale   of   impact   on   provincial   jurisdiction   that   is   reconcilable  
with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the 
Constitution.
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree 
of singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly 
distinguishes it from matter of provincial concern it is relevant to 
consider what would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a 
provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of 
the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.42 
The scenario of an epidemic has been frequently invoked in the 
POGG  jurisprudence  as  an  example  of  a  matter  concerning  the  nation  as  
a whole.43 Under the Emergency branch I will consider the prospect of 
(4th) 415 at para. 69 [Malmo-Levine cited to S.C.R.]. Additionally, some case law 
suggests a possible third dimension of POGG, referred to as the ‘gap’ branch by 
Professor Hogg, supra note 29, s. 17.2. However, it will not be discussed here as it 
has  not  been  expressly  recognized  by  the  jurisprudence  and  thus,  it  is  unlikely  that  
Parliament  would  rely  upon  it  as  the  source  of  its  jurisdiction  over  public  health.
37  [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [Crown Zellerbach cited to S.C.R.].
38  Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, 4 D.L.R. 609.
39  Munro v. Canada (National Capital Commission), [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 D.L.R. 
(2d) 753. 
40  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37.
41  Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 107 
D.L.R. (4th) 457.
42  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432 [emphasis added].
43  See e.g. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 at 412, 2 
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temporary legislation enacted for combating an existing emergency, but 
under the National Concern branch the discussion need not be so con-
strained.  Consistent  with  the  principle  that  full  subject  matter  jurisdic-
tion  will  be  granted  to  Parliament  where  the  matter  satisfies  the  Crown 
Zellerbach factors,44 there is a case to be made that federal legislation 
respecting infectious disease need not be limited to purely reactive 
measures, but may also provide for the prevention of disease outbreaks. 
Indeed, in Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Federation the Privy 
Council held that: 
[T]o legislate for prevention appears to be on the same basis as 
legislation for cure. A pestilence has been given as an example of a 
subject  so  affecting,  or  which  might  so  affect,  the  whole  Dominion  
that   it  would   justify   legislation  by   the  Parliament  of  Canada  as   a  
mater concerning the order and good government of the Dominion. 
It would seem to follow that if the Parliament could legislate when 
there was an actual epidemic it could do so to prevent one occurring 
and also to prevent it happening again.45 
Thus, the case law alone provides a strong foundation for advancing 
infectious disease control under the National Concern branch. At the 
same time, it has never been seriously disputed that the provinces can 
legislate in respect to public health, including the prevention and control 
of disease. Indeed, the public health statutes of most provinces include 
broad provisions for combating public health crises such as epidemics.46 
But,  as  witnessed  during  the  SARS  outbreak  of  2003,  the  definition  of  
“epidemic” or “health emergency” may vary from one health authority 
to  another,  just  as  the  assignment  of  such  a  designation  may  be  laden  
with local politics.47 Faced with the lack of distinction between public 
D.L.R. 5; Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at 205, 
207, 2 D.L.R. 1 [Canada Temperance]; Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1980] 1 
S.C.R. 914 at 934, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594.
44  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 433.
45  Canada Temperance, supra note 43 at 207 [emphasis added].
46  See e.g. Saskatchewan’s Public Health Act, 1994, S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1, s. 45.
47  China was widely criticized for under-reporting the severity of the epidemic in 
its early stages, both to its own citizens and to the international community. There 
was speculation that the under-reporting was part of larger efforts to ensure political 
and civil stability as the national legislatures opened for their next session. See e.g. 
Time  Asia,  “How  Bad  Is  It?  Beijing  has  come  clean,  but  the  litmus  test  of  China’s  
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health practice and a public health emergency, where then might the 
POGG power crystallize on the basis of National Concern? 
Returning to the relevant factors in Crown Zellerbach,  the  jurispru-
dence makes it clear that neither health nor public health generally, will 
be a matter capable of attaining such “singleness” or “distinctiveness”. 
Indeed, in Schneider v. The Queen, Estey J.48 held that:
‘[H]ealth’  is  not  a  matter  which  is  subject  to  specific  constitutional  
assignment but instead is an amorphous topic which can be 
addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in 
the circumstances of each case on the nature or scope of the health 
problem in question.49
 
It follows that the National Concern doctrine will only be available, 
if  at  all,  in  limited  circumstances  and  for  very  specific  public  health  pur-
poses. However, even the oft-cited example of an epidemic may require 
further  refining  before  it  would  attract  such  its  application.  Whereas  it  is  
easy to imagine how an infectious disease could quickly become a mat-
ter of extra-provincial concern, the “distinctiveness” requirement and 
its focus on striking an appropriate balance of powers may pose the real 
challenge to federal legislation in this area. 
Environmental pollution may provide a useful analogy to disease 
control, and the case law on that topic offers guidance on the distinctive-
ness inquiry. In R. v. Hydro-Québec,50 several provisions of the Cana-
dian Environmental Protection Act were challenged as being ultra vires 
the federal government. The sections in issue purported to regulate the 
release of substances that could harm the environment or present a dan-
ger to human health. The four-member minority declined to uphold the 
provisions under the criminal law power and moved on to the National 
Concern test under POGG.51 On the issue of distinctiveness, Lamer and 
new openness is Shanghai,” (28 April 2003) online: <http://www.time.com/time/
asia/covers/501030505/story.html>;;  Time  Asia,  “Beijing’s  SARS  Attack:  Doctor  and  
party  member  insists  there  are  many  more  cases  than  officials  will  admit,”  (8  April  
2003) online: <http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,441615,00.html>. 
48     Concurring  with  the  majority.
49  Schneider, supra note 6 at 142.
50  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec cited to S.C.R.].
51     The  five-­member  majority  upheld  the  Act  as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  criminal  law  
power and thus, declined to consider it under POGG.
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Iacobucci JJ.52 held the Act’s  definition  of  “toxic  substances”  to  be  “an  
all-­encompassing  definition  with  no  clear  limits,”53 thus failing to meet 
the distinctiveness requirement. 
In Crown Zellerbach, the issue was the application of the Ocean 
Dumping  Control  Act to marine pollution in intra-provincial marine wa-
ters. Upholding the Act  under  POGG,  the  four-­member  majority  con-
cluded that pollution of marine waters by the dumping of substances 
was  sufficiently  distinct  from  other  forms  of  water  pollution.  One  of  the  
reasons  for  this  finding  was  the  difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  boundaries  
between intra-provincial and extra-provincial marine waters; it was ar-
gued  that  this  difficulty  “creates  an  unacceptable  degree  of  uncertainty  
for the application of regulatory and penal provisions.”54 The minor-
ity, however, held that marine pollution was incapable of the requisite 
distinctiveness because environmental pollution in general is “all-per-
vasive”  and   furthermore,  because  of   the  difficulty   in  determining   the  
boundaries between marine and fresh water (to which the impugned 
provisions did not apply).55 
At this point it is important to make a distinction between the true 
pith and substance of the legislation and the means selected for address-
ing   its   subject  matter.   It   is   the   subject  matter   that  must  be  “distinct,”  
not the means employed to address it. Thus, although the hypothetical 
legislation may contemplate a vast array of disease-control measures, 
the  distinctiveness  of  the  subject  matter  itself  will  not  suffer  as  a  conse-
quence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the pith and sub-
stance of the legislation cannot be challenged on the basis that there are 
alternative, more effective means of achieving that purpose.56 Thus, the 
wisdom of Parliament will not be questioned when it comes to the meth-
ods it chooses for the management and control of infectious disease. 
 On the other hand, the legal effect of the legislation may assist 
in illustrating its pith and substance, and thus, may be relevant to the 
distinctiveness inquiry. As held by McLachlin C.J. in Ward v. Canada 
(Attorney General):
52     Sopinka  and  Major  JJ.  concurring.
53  Hydro-Québec, supra note 50 at 260.
54  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 437.
55  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 455, 457.
56  [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 42 at 582 [Ward cited to S.C.R.]. 
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The legal effect refers to how the law will affect rights and 
liabilities, and is also helpful in illuminating the core meaning of the 
law[…]. The effects can also reveal whether a law is “colourable”, 
i.e. does the law in form appear to address something within the 
legislature’s  jurisdiction,  but  in  substance  deal  with  a  matter  outside  
that  jurisdiction?57
There can be no doubt that federal public health legislation will af-
fect legal rights that are usually reserved for regulation by the provinces. 
For example, more stringent reporting requirements imposed upon phy-
sicians  and  other  health  care  providers  will  impact  the  confidential  na-
ture of the patient-provider relationship. Quarantine and isolation provi-
sions may affect the legal relationship as between employers and their 
employees  who  are  subjected  to  orders  under  such  provisions.  However  
the Supreme Court has held that:
‘[I]mpact’   with   nothing   more   is   clearly   not   enough   to   find   that  
a   statute   encroaches   upon   the   jurisdiction   of   the   other   level   of  
government.58 
Therefore, short of an allegation that the federal law is colourable in 
such a way that it attempts to regulate a provincial matter, the intra-pro-
vincial effects will not compromise the validity of the federal law.
The reasoning in the pollution cases illustrates the distinction be-
tween pith and substance and legislative means. In Crown Zellerbach, 
for   example,   the   disagreement   between   the  majority   and   the   dissent  
arose  over  whether  marine  pollution  was  a  sufficiently  distinct  subject  
matter. The fact that regulation of marine pollution under the Ocean 
Dumping  Control  Act would involve the regulation of provincial activ-
ity such as construction and municipal activity did not compromise the 
distinctiveness of the issue; it simply provided an incentive for the ap-
pellant corporation to challenge the Act. In Hydro-Québec, the minority 
was troubled by the impugned legislation’s broad conception of “toxic 
substances”  as  a  subject  matter;;  their  analysis  was  not  concerned  with  
the proposed means of regulating those substances, regardless of how 
far-reaching those means might have been. Thus, the expansive gamut 
57  Ibid. at 579.
58  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 567, 83 
D.L.R. (4th) 297 [CAP Reference cited to S.C.R.].
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of measures that might be taken in respect of preventing or controlling a 
specific  disease  does  not  compromise  the  distinctiveness  of  the  subject  
matter. The distinctiveness must be found in the matter to be prevented 
or controlled. 
Generally speaking, “communicable disease” captures a vast range 
of infections from chickenpox to smallpox, from salmonella poisoning 
to  tuberculosis,  from  gonorrhoea  to  HIV.  In  other  words,  the  definition  
of “communicable disease” may suffer from the same absence of as-
certainable outer limits as did “toxic substances” in the view of the dis-
senting  judges  in  Hydro-Québec. Accordingly, there is a strong case for 
making federal public health legislation such as the hypothetical PHPA 
applicable  only  to  specific  diseases  or  circumstances  (such  as  an  unu-
sually sizeable outbreak of an otherwise less worrisome disease) and 
furthermore, for providing clear and meaningful criteria for determining 
which diseases or circumstances will trigger its application. 
In assessing the distinctiveness of infectious disease:
[I]t is relevant to consider what would be the effect on extra-
provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the 
control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.59 
Often referred to as the “provincial inability test,” this factor tells us that 
the  mere  desirability  of  uniform  legislation  will  not  suffice,  despite  the  
national  importance  of  the  subject  matter.  The  relevant  concern  is  not  a  
question of legislative capacity or the adequacy of provincial resources, 
but whether the intra-provincial efforts of one province in this regard 
would be compromised by the legislative choices or inaction on the part 
of  another.  The  provincial  inability  test  will  only  be  satisfied  if  the  fail-
ure  by  one  province  to  adequately  deal  with  the  subject  matter  would  
lead to harm for the other provinces that had taken steps to address the 
matter. 
Those  cases  that  have  satisfied  the  test  to  date  centred  on  issues  such  
as aeronautics, atomic energy and marine pollution. Given the nature of 
these  subject  matters,  little  serious  discussion  of  the  provincial  inability  
test was required. As a result, relatively little guidance exists as to the 
lower threshold of provincial inability. 
59  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432.
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Hogg, however, suggests that an epidemic is likely to satisfy the 
test. He observes that: 
[T]he failure of one province to take preventative measures would 
probably lead to the spreading of disease into those provinces which 
had taken preventative measures.60 
Such a claim has immediate appeal, even if we have seen examples 
to the contrary. For example, during the SARS crisis of 2003, other 
provinces were relatively fortunate in that the outbreak remained lo-
calized to Ontario. Under such strain, the shortcomings of its public 
health system were brought to light and severely criticized.61 Consider-
ing these shortcomings, the fact that the epidemic did not spread beyond 
the provincial borders was perhaps due largely to luck, for the simple 
fact remains: pathogens, like pollution, do not respect borders. Should 
one province fail to adequately address infectious disease control within 
in  own  population,  the  movement  of  cross-­border  traffic  and  even  goods  
could quickly transport the disease to other regions which had previous-
ly avoided such an outbreak by adopting strict preventative measures. 
The National Concern doctrine also requires “that the scale of fed-
eral intrusion upon provincial authority must be reconcilable with the 
constitutional division of powers.”62  This  principle  qualifies  the  broad  
label of “National Concern” and assists in setting the parameters of a 
federal regime. The above analysis suggests that legislation such as the 
hypothetical PHPA would be supportable under this branch, but there 
are several qualities of public health which make the division of powers 
reconciliation  difficult.  First,  since  Confederation  public  health  has  been  
dealt with almost exclusively by the provinces and, in that time, com-
prehensive legislation and authoritative bodies have been established in 
each  jurisdiction.  Federal  initiatives  will  likely  have  to  rely  upon  the  ex-
isting public health infrastructure of each province for their successful 
execution.  Secondly,  the  difficulty  in  separating  everyday  public  health  
practice from federal activities with nation-wide importance poses prac-
tical problems in determining when the respective boundaries are being 
overstepped. Finally, where public health practice is most successful at 
60  Hogg, supra note 29 at ss. 17.3(b).
61  See especially Campbell Commission, Interim Report, supra note 13.
62  Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432.
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preventing and controlling disease, it is arguably very private in nature, 
and inextricably linked to the provincially-regulated practitioner-patient 
relationship, health insurance and hospitals. Assuming for the sake of 
argument that federal legislation could satisfy the other requirements 
under the National Concern branch, the real challenge may arise in min-
imizing  its  impact  upon  the  long-­standing  provincial  jurisdiction  over  
public health. 
Finally, it is important to remember even without an attempt by Par-
liament to legislate in this area, a challenge to existing provincial public 
health  laws  may  result  in  a  finding  that  the  subject  matter  is  truly  an  in-
ter-provincial concern and thus, within the exclusive legislative purview 
of Parliament. For example, in Inter-provincial Co-op Ltd v. Manitoba63 
the  majority  held  that  the  provincial  legislation  that  attempted  to  control  
and remedy intra-provincial harm resulting from extra-provincial pollu-
tion was ultra vires. Although the federal government was not a party 
to the case, the Court declared that Parliament had exclusive authority 
over  the  subject  matter  under  their  residual  power.  
ii. The Emergency Branch
Rendered   a   near-­fiction   by   earlier   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council,64 
POGG’s Emergency branch of was revitalized by the Supreme Court in 
the Anti-­Inflation  Reference.65 The reasoning of the Supreme Court in 
this case illustrates the difference between this branch and the National 
Concern branch. In Anti-­Inflation, despite the fact that the all-pervasive 
nature  of  ‘inflation’  would  not  likely  meet  the  distinctiveness  require-
ment under National Concern, the statute was upheld as valid emergen-
cy  legislation  by  seven  of  the  nine  judges,  as  reflected  in  two  separate  
judgments.66 
63  [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 [Inter-provincial Co-op cited to S.C.R.].
64  Save for during times of war and the immediate post-war periods, the Privy 
Council was unwilling to uphold federal legislation under this branch. For a 
discussion on this point, see Hogg, supra note 29 at 17.4(a)-(b). 
65  [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [Anti-­Inflation  Reference cited to 
S.C.R.].
66  Laskin C.J. writing for Judson, Spence and Dickson JJ and Ritchie J. writing for 
Martland and Pigeon JJ.
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Both  sets  of  reasons  affirm  that  the  term  “emergency”  in  this  sense  
need not be limited to times of war, but the legislation must be tempo-
rary in nature. It was made clear that courts should not inquire into the 
actual existence of an emergency but, in a more deferential approach, 
should  focus  on  whether  Parliament  had  a  rational  basis  for  finding  that  
an emergency existed.67 Further, Parliament will not have the onus of 
establishing the rational basis; rather, the responsibility will be on the 
party challenging the legislation to prove its absence.68 
The issue that split the Court is illustrative of the breadth afforded to 
the  definition  of  “emergency”  in  this  judgment.  Despite  the  considerable  
expert evidence advanced to discount the existence of an economic cri-
sis and the relative paucity of supporting or rebuttal evidence advanced 
by the federal government, the Court did not split on the “rational basis” 
consideration. This may very well mark the height of deference afforded 
to Parliament by the Court. Rather, the dissenting reasons concern Par-
liament’s failure to make an explicit declaration that it was legislating 
under its residual emergency powers. On this issue, Beetz J. wrote:
Parliament cannot enter the normally forbidden area of provincial 
jurisdiction  unless   it  gives  an  unmistakable  signal   that   it   is  acting  
pursuant to its extraordinary power. Such a signal is not conclusive 
to support the legitimacy of the action of Parliament but its absence 
is fatal.69
The   reasoning   of   the   majority   in   Anti-­Inflation and the Court’s 
strong deference to Parliament suggest that a federal law enacted for the 
sole purpose of combating an epidemic would be intra vires Parliament. 
However,  given  the  hesitation  of  the  dissenting  judges  in  the  same  case,  
Parliament would be wise to explicitly invoke the Emergency power as 
the  basis  for  subject  matter  jurisdiction.70 However, it must be remem-
67  Anti-­Inflation  Reference, supra note 65 at 425.
68  Martland and Pigeon JJ. concurring. The reasons of Laskin C.J. are more elusive 
on this point, although they have since been interpreted to place the same onus on the 
challenging party.
69  Anti-­Inflation  Reference, supra note 65 at 463.
70     The  political  ramifications  of  making  such  a  declaration  are  outside  the  scope  of  
this discussion, but it is recognized that there may be hesitation on the part of elected 
officials  to  employ  such  potentially  panic-­inducing  terminology  such  as  “public  
health emergency”.
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bered  that  such  a  finding  amounts  to  only  a  temporary  suspension  of  the  
division  of  powers.  If  the  subject  matter  of  disease  control  is  otherwise  
within  provincial  jurisdiction,  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  epidemic  such  
jurisdiction  will  revert  back  to  the  provinces.  Thus,  for  sources  of  fed-
eral  jurisdiction  on  an  ongoing  basis,  the  National  Concern  branch  is  the  
more attractive option under POGG.   
However, given that the courts have been cautious in their applica-
tion of the National Concern branch, as well as the deference shown to 
Parliament in Anti-­Inflation  with  respect   to   the  finding  of  a  bona  fide 
emergency, Parliament may be wise to make use of this branch. This 
route would be particularly attractive should Parliament wish to have 
only temporary management of disease control. For example, contem-
porary concerns such as SARS or Avian Flu may lend themselves to 
federal  jurisdiction  so  long  as  they  remain  relatively  new  threats.  The  
necessarily temporary nature of Emergency legislation requires that 
Parliament   re-­visit   the  subject  matter  at  a   later  date  and,   if  continued  
jurisdiction  is  desirable  at  that  time,  requires  that  a  factual  foundation  
be provided to support permanent legislation. 
2. Criminal Law Power
In RJR-­MacDonald  Inc.  v.  Canada  (A.G.)71 the Supreme Court reviewed 
the federal criminal law power and its application in the health context. 
The requirements were succinctly produced by La Forest J.72 after de-
clining  to  consider  POGG  as  the  jurisdictional  basis  for  the  impugned  
Tobacco Products Control Act: 
[T]he scope of the federal power to create criminal legislation 
with respect to health matters is broad, and is circumscribed only 
by the requirements that the legislation must contain a prohibition 
accompanied by a penal sanction and must be directed at a legitimate 
public health evil.73 
These requirements - a legitimate public purpose, and one or more pro-
hibitions supported by a penalty - will be discussed below. 
71  [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [RJR-­MacDonald cited to S.C.R.].
72     Writing  for  the  majority  on  the  division  of  powers  issue.
73   RJR-­MacDonald, supra note 71 at 246.
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Short work can be made of establishing a valid public purpose be-
hind legislation aimed at the control of infectious diseases. It has been 
held that “[p]ublic peace, order, security, health, morality: these are the 
ordinary though not exclusive ends served by that law,”74 and disease 
control could easily be argued as serving several of these purposes and 
infectious diseases surely amount to a public health evil. 
The reasoning in Schneider75 is illustrative of the difference between 
a health-related purpose and a public health purpose. In that case, Brit-
ish Columbia sought to uphold provincial legislation providing for the 
detention and treatment of heroin addicts. In challenging the law’s va-
lidity, the Appellant argued that such measures were in pith and sub-
stance criminal law, and thus were ultra vires the province. Although 
the statute was ultimately upheld as a valid exercise of provincial power 
pursuant to s. 92(16), the case can be distinguished on the basis that the 
law was directed towards the rehabilitation of the individual rather than 
the protection of the community at large. The societal dangers of heroin 
addiction are quite different than the threats posed by infectious disease. 
As measures taken in respect of such diseases are aimed at safeguarding 
the welfare of the greater community, laws that call for such measures 
are likely to have the requisite public purpose to be upheld as valid 
criminal law. 
The next requirement from RJR-­McDonald is that the law must cre-
ate one or more prohibitions directed towards the public purpose, in 
this case, control of an infectious disease. For examples of prohibitions 
that might be included in our hypothetical legislation, we can look to 
existing provincial public health statutes, where prohibitions include: 
the failure by a health professional to report to the local public health 
authority  in  respect  of  a  notifiable  disease,  the  failure  by  an  individual  
to follow isolation or quarantine orders, and more generally, the failure 
by an individual to comply with the precautionary measures ordered 
by  a  public  health  official,  such  as  notification  of  family  members  and  
contacts of one’s infectious status.76 
The third requirement of a valid criminal law is that a penalty must 
attach  to  any  prohibitions.  The  imposition  of  a  fine  or  prison  term  for  
74 Reference  re:  Dairy  Industry  Act  (Canada)  s.  5(a), [1949] S.C.R. 1 at 50, 1 D.L.R. 
433, aff’d [1951] A.C. 179.
75  Schneider, supra note 6.
76  See generally Schulz, supra note 27.
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non-compliance is typical of both criminal law and existing provincial 
public health legislation.77 However, Parliament could hardly criminal-
ize the mere status of having an infectious disease, and short of deliber-
ate transmission or the failure to comply with preventative measures 
ordered   by   public   health   officials,   it  would   present   an   administrative  
nightmare78 to criminalize the spreading of disease from one individual 
to another. Instead, public health laws often seek to prohibit and/or en-
force conduct that appears to be ancillary to disease control, such as the 
required  reporting  of  notifiable  diseases  by  health  care  professionals  to  
the local public health authority for surveillance purposes. It was held 
in RJR-­McDonald that such an approach – the criminalizing of ancillary 
activity without criminalizing the underlying activity itself – does not 
necessarily compromise the criminal nature of the law.79 Given this rea-
soning, Parliament would have wide latitude in selecting the measures 
to be used in combating and managing infectious disease. 
Where a federal law that claims to be criminal in nature has the ef-
fect of creating a regulatory scheme allowing for exemptions and the 
exercise of administrative discretion, that law may face a constitutional 
challenge on the basis that it does not create a true prohibition and thus, 
is not a valid criminal law.80 This becomes important when drafting fed-
eral public health legislation, in that existing provincial public health 
statutes include numerous exemptions and often authorize the exercise 
of  discretion  by  public  health  officials  in  enforcing  the  statutory  provi-
sions. For example, Manitoba’s Public Health Act allows individuals 
with an infectious disease to be exempted from a treatment order where 
77  Although it is unclear as to how often, if at all, the penalties are imposed for the 
purpose of enforcing provincial public health efforts. In fact, many of the penalty 
provisions  appear  to  be  outdated,  providing  in  some  cases  for  very  limited  fines  in  
consequence of some of the more serious offences under these acts. For example, 
s. 34 of Newfoundland’s Communicable  Diseases  Act (R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-26) 
provides that:
[A]  person  wilfully  committing  a  breach  of  this  Act  shall  be  subject  
to a penalty not exceeding $100, or in default of payment, to 
imprisonment  for  a  period  not  exceeding  30  days,  or  to  both  a  fine  
and imprisonment.
78  Not to mention ripe grounds for a Charter challenge.
79  RJR-­MacDonald, supra note 71 at 258.
80  See e.g. Reference re: Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 185 D.L.R. 
(4th) 577 [Firearms Reference cited to S.C.R.]; Hydro-Québec, supra note 50.
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they oppose such treatment on religious grounds.81 Under the Ontario 
Health Protection and Promotion Act, physicians have broad discre-
tion in the types of directives they provide to patients suffering from 
an infectious disease, and non-compliance with those directives consti-
tutes an offence under the Act.82 Similar exemptions and discretion may 
be included in federal public health legislation, and it may very well 
resemble a regulatory scheme. However, if the primary raison d’être 
behind  federal  jurisdiction  in  this  area  is  the  highly  virulent  nature  of  
particular diseases and the need for a common, standardized approach 
to their control, one would expect that such exemptions and discretion 
would be more circumscribed than in general provincial public health 
legislation.
In any event, federal legislation in this area is bound to be complex 
and is likely to appear regulatory in nature. The reasons in the Firearms 
Reference provide guidance as to drafting criminal law of this sort. In 
that case, the Court held that “[t]he fact that the [Firearms] Act is com-
plex does not necessarily detract from its criminal nature.”83 Despite the 
allowance   for   administrative  discretion   in   the   registration  of  firearms  
and the licensing of their users, the Court found that the discretion was 
not  overly  broad,  and  it  was  sufficiently  informed  by  the  Act. Indeed, 
even if a statute gives full discretion to the responsible Minister, that is 
not necessarily enough to take the statute out of the criminal domain.84
3. The Spending Power
Although not an explicit head of power under s. 91, the federal spend-
ing power in s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 198285 affords Parliament the 
81  C.C.S.M., c. P210 at s. 32.
82  R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7 at ss. 22, 100.
83  Firearms Reference, supra note 80 at 805-806.
84  As was the case with the legislation in Hydro-Québec, supra note 50. 
85  Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution Act, 
1982]. Section 36 provides:
36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial 
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their 
legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of 
Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to  
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering 
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opportunity  to  influence  many  provincial  activities.  Through  the  use  of  
conditional grants, Parliament can provide incentives to the provinces 
to exercise their constitutional powers in accordance with federally-de-
termined standards. The Canada Health Act operates in this manner, 
providing for transfer payments to the provinces on the condition that 
their  provincial  health  insurance  programs  comply  with  the  five  criteria  
outlined in the Act.86 
The Canada Health Act and several other acts were challenged in 
Winterhaven Stables v. Canada under the claim that they were statutes 
in relation to exclusively provincial matters and thus, were ultra vires 
Parliament. The Alberta Court of Appeal adopted the reasons of the trial 
judge  in  holding  that:
Parliament…is entitled to spend the money that it raises through 
proper exercise of its taxing power in the manner that it chooses to 
authorize. It can impose conditions on such disposition so long as 
the conditions do not amount in fact to a regulation or control of a 
matter outside federal authority.87
Although the sheer size of the grant or the province’s palpable need for 
the funds may appear to blur the line between incentive and coercion, 
the case law suggests that the courts will not look behind the legisla-
tion to question whether the province had a real choice as to whether to 
accept a conditional grant.88 Provided that the grant is not a colourable 
attempt by Parliament to regulate a matter falling exclusively within 
provincial   jurisdiction,   the   courts   will   not   interfere.   For   example,   in  
Winterhaven, the Court held that the purpose of the impugned statutes 
was “the allocation of federal funds to assist the provinces in providing 
economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and  
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.  
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of 
making  equalization  payments  to  ensure  that  provincial  governments  have  sufficient  
revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation.
86  Canada Health Act, supra note 2 at s. 7. The criteria laid out in s. 7 include: 
public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and accessibility.
87  (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 413 (Alta. C.A.) at 434 [Winterhaven]. 
88  See e.g. Winterhaven, supra note 87; CAP Reference, supra note 58. 
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services”89 and found that this was consistent with the history of cost-
shared programmes as expressly contemplated in section 36.
A recent article by discusses the federal spending power as a means 
of implementing national public health standards as designed by PHAC 
at the provincial level.90 Indeed, s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982 ap-
pears to support federal spending with respect to public health. What 
remains unclear is whether or not the federal government can impose 
conditions  upon  such  a  grant  absent  explicit  constitutional  jurisdiction  
with  respect  to  public  health.  While  the  jurisprudence  does  not  openly  
contemplate any such requirement before the creation of a conditional 
grant,  such  a  requirement  may  be  understood  from  the  qualification  that  
the conditions “do not amount in fact to a regulation or control of a mat-
ter outside federal authority.”91 However, more likely is the case that 
this  qualifier   functions   to  provide  a   limit  on   the  degree  of   federal   in-
volvement,  rather  demanding  federal  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  mat-
ter involved.
The value of invoking the spending power to achieve national dis-
ease-control standards is also its weakness. By affording the provinces a 
choice as to whether to accept a conditional grant from the PHAC, their 
jurisdiction  over  basic  health  matters  is  respected.  They  can  choose  not  
to adopt the federal condition and instead employ their own legislation. 
The possibility that one or more provinces would choose that option 
would provide considerable incentive for federal-provincial collabora-
tion in creating the conditions in an effort to achieve the buy-in of the 
provinces. However, if one province should refuse to agree to the condi-
tions, the value of the national scheme is compromised.92 This could be 
89  Winterhaven, supra note 87 at 433.
90  Kumanan Wilson, “A Canadian Agency for Public Health: Could it Work?” 
(2004) 170(2) Canadian Medical Association Journal 222. The article does not 
discuss what these standards would look like, but for the purposes of this article 
they  are  contemplated  as  the  measures  specified  in  the  hypothetical  legislation  (e.g.,  
standardized reporting requirements, treatment provisions, vaccination programs, 
etc.). Dr. Wilson discusses the recommendations contained in Learning from SARS 
(supra note 8), namely, that if a more collaborative approach as between the federal 
and provincial governments should fail, Parliament could resort to its spending 
power and/or federal legislation for the purpose of achieving the PHAC’s national 
standards at the provincial level. 
91  Winterhaven, supra note 87.
92     As  discussed  above  under  POGG,  specifically  the  National  Concern  branch’s  
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a very real danger with respect to conditions around mandatory treat-
ment given that some provinces take a very libertarian approach to such 
issues.93 Furthermore, as the provincial public health infrastructure is 
long-standing and well-established, the availability of additional fed-
eral  funding  for  public  health  may  not  be  sufficiently  compelling  to  the  
provinces such that they will acquiesce to the attached conditions if they 
oppose them. Federal funding may prove more attractive with respect 
to  costly  novel  programs  which  exist  in  few,  if  any,  jurisdictions.  How-
ever, if the purpose of the funding is to supplement existing provincial 
programs while securing compliance with newly drafted federal stand-
ards, the persuasive value of that funding may be considerably less, 
particularly when it comes to the larger provinces. For these reasons, 
the importance of the federal spending power is limited with respect to 
enacting national public health standards. 
4. Quarantine and Marine Hospitals
As  mentioned  above,  Parliament  has  jurisdiction  over  “Quarantine  and  
Marine Hospitals.”94 This power is manifested in the Quarantine Act,95 
which provides for the detection and management of certain infectious 
diseases at international points of entry and departure. While the health 
powers under the Act extend to the reporting of personal health informa-
tion, health assessment of individuals, disease testing, quarantine, isola-
tion and treatment, the reference in s. 91(11) to marine hospitals appears 
to  limit  its  application  to  international  border  traffic  (with  the  primary  
focus on incoming travellers), rather than recognizing a generally ap-
provincial inability test.
93  For example, under the Quebec Public Health Act (R.S.Q., c. S-2.2) the only 
disease for which treatment can be mandated is tuberculosis (although individuals 
suffering from other diseases may be required to remain in isolation). By contrast, 
Saskatchewan’s Public Health Act, 1994, (S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1) allows a medical 
health  officer  to  order  the  treatment  of  an  individual  where  the  officer  considers  it  
necessary to decrease or eliminate the health risk presented by an infectious disease.
94  Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(11).
95  R.S.C. 1985, c. Q-1. This legislation will be replaced by Bill C-12, An Act to 
prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases, 1st Sess., 38th Parl. 
(assented to on May 12, 2005) once the accompanying quarantine regulations have 
been completed and approved.
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plicable federal public health power. Furthermore, the quarantine power 
is perhaps a necessary but limited corollary of Parliament’s immigration 
power96 and the resulting authority over national borders. Thus, despite 
the fact that the federal quarantine power is the only explicit consti-
tutional reference to public health, its presence in s. 91 provides little 
assistance  in  the  broader  discussion  of  public  health  and  its  proper  juris-
dictional assignment. 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN UNDER 
PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION
In Schneider, Dickson J.97 held that: 
[T]his   view   that   the   general   jurisdiction   over   health   matters   is  
provincial  (allowing  for  a  limited  federal  jurisdiction  either  ancillary  
to the express heads of power in s. 91 or the emergency power under 
peace, order and good government) has prevailed and is now not 
seriously questioned.98 
As the primary focus of this article has been to examine the counter-ar-
guments of this view with respect to public health, it is now necessary to 
examine its foundational underpinnings. However, the provincial heads 
of power, particularly those with which we are concerned here, have 
not received the same type of analytical treatment by the courts as we 
have seen for the federal heads of power. For example, there is neither 
a ‘test’ nor prescribed indicia for determining whether a matter is one 
of a “local and private nature,” under s. 92(16). Similarly, “property 
and civil rights”99 simply encompass easily recognizable matters such 
as tort law, contracts and the regulation of professional relationships. 
Thus, in responding to the federal arguments above, the discussion fo-
cuses  on  the  conceptual  rather  than  legal  arguments  for  provincial  ju-
risdiction over the control of infectious disease. Municipal Institutions 
will  be  considered  first,  in  light  of  their  historical  role  in  public  health  
leadership.  Consistent  with  the  jurisprudence,  Hospitals,  Property  and  
96  Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(25).
97  As he then was, writing for the Court.
98  Schneider, supra note 6 at 137.
99  Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 92(13).
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Civil Rights and Matters of a Local or Private Nature will be addressed 
together.
1. Municipal Institutions
The provinces were given authority to legislate in relation to “Munici-
pal Institutions in the Province” by s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act and, 
since prior to Confederation, municipalities have taken responsibility 
for numerous public health matters.100 Indeed, even today municipal 
public health authorities are the ‘front line’ for combating epidemics 
and other public health threats. While s. 92(8) does not provide a foun-
dation upon which the provinces can legislate directly with respect to 
public  health,  the  argument  for  provincial  jurisdiction  over  such  matters  
is  supported  by  the  long-­standing  role  of  municipalities  as  the  first  line  
of public health defence, and the constitutional relationship between the 
municipalities and their province. 
The constitutional authority for such municipal and thus, provin-
cial,  responsibility  was  confirmed  in  several  early  cases.  For  example,  
municipal by-laws directed at infectious disease control were upheld 
as   valid   exercises   of   provincial   jurisdiction.101 In a slightly different 
approach, an earlier case found that the inherent responsibility of mu-
nicipalities with respect to public health activities gave the provinces 
jurisdiction  over  public  health  by  way  of  s.  92(8).102 In a more recent 
case, a municipal by-law prohibiting close-contact dancing in adult en-
tertainment parlours was upheld as a valid exercise of municipal and 
provincial authority to legislation in relation to public health.103 In that 
case, the city of Toronto claimed its by-law was directed towards the 
health risks posed by close-contact dancing to both exotic dancers and 
patrons. The applicant challenged the law on the grounds that it sought 
100  See generally Rowell-Sirois Report, supra note 21 at 32-34; Jackman, supra note 
19 at 115; Learning from SARS, supra note 8 at 2, 19, 49-51.
101  Re George Bowack, [1892] B.C.J. No. 33 (S.C.) (QL); Canadian  Pacific  
Navigation Co. v. Vancouver (City), [1892] B.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.) (QL).
102  La Municipalité St. Louis du Mile End c. La Cité de Montréal (1885), 2 M.L.R. 
(S.C.) 218.
103  Re Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Association and Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto, 26 O.R. (3d) 257 (Gen. Div.), aff’d (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 161 
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 594 (QL). 
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to regulate morality and was thus criminal law, and ultra vires the mu-
nicipality. The Ontario Provincial Court held that any element of moral-
ity was merely ancillary to the broader purposes of protecting health 
and preventing crime in licensed entertainment establishments, both of 
which  were  held  to  be  valid  municipal  and  provincial  objectives.
The principles in these cases are consistent with the basic logic re-
garding the role of the local community in managing threats to its citi-
zens. A municipality is the best positioned to know its residents, identify 
risks as they arise, and respond in the manner best-suited to that com-
munity’s unique needs and culture. Furthermore, people are likely to 
rely  first  and  foremost  on  their  closest   level  of  government  to  protect  
them from such risks. 
2. Hospitals, Property and Civil Rights, Matters of a Local or 
Private Nature
Taken together, these three sections are thought to give the provinces 
primary   jurisdiction  over  health  and  public  health.104 As alluded to in 
the Introduction, these provisions have been held to ground a nearly 
exclusive provincial power to legislate in relation to health and health 
care. However, for public health purposes, the former two provisions 
are  arguably   less  pertinent   than   is   the   jurisdiction  over   local  and  pri-
vate matters. The power to legislate in relation to “the establishment, 
maintenance and management of hospitals, charities and eleemosynary 
institutions in and for the province”105 relates primarily to issues such 
as funding and other administrative matters related to the governance 
of hospitals and similar institutions.106 This power is also thought to 
include  subjects  such  as  patient  rights  and  treatment  standards,107 both 
of which are relevant to public health practice. However, the broader 
community-based concerns of infectious disease control can be argued 
to  transport  the  subject  away  from  the  hospital  power  and  ground  it  in  
s. 92(16), with patient rights and treatment standards being corollary 
to   the   subject  matter.   Likewise,  while   the   regulation   of   relationships  
104  See e.g. Schneider, supra note 6.
105  Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 92(7).
106  See generally Jackman, supra note 19 at 110-111.
107  Supra note 19 at 110-111. 
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between health professionals and their patients, and provincial health 
insurance schemes, both of which fall under s. 92(13), are implicated 
in the public health system, property and civil rights does not ground 
general provincial efforts aimed at infectious disease management. 
In a discussion paper prepared for the Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada, André Braën suggests that “health itself can be 
seen on the whole as a strictly local matter”108 and thus, granted to the 
provinces under s. 92(16). This proposition is supported by the case law. 
For  example,  the  majority  in  Schneider relied upon that section to up-
hold provincial legislation providing for the detention and treatment of 
heroin addicts. In R. v. Morgentaler109 the  Supreme  Court  confirmed  that  
view, holding that “[s]ection 92(16) also gives [the provinces] general 
jurisdiction  over  health  matters  within  the  province.”110 
Despite the generous provincial allowance under that section, in 
Morgentaler the Court found Nova Scotia’s provisions restricting abor-
tion services to be criminal law in pith and substance. Review of extrin-
sic evidence such as the transcripts of legislative debates revealed that 
the legislation was directed at preventing the “perceived public harm or 
evil” of private abortion clinics.111 In delineating the difference between 
the  criminal  law  power  and  provincial  jurisdiction  over  health,  Sopinka  
J. wrote:
[I]f the central concern of the present legislation were medical 
treatment of unwanted pregnancies and the safety and security of the 
pregnant woman, not the restriction of abortion services with a view 
to safeguarding the public interest or interdicting a public harm, the 
legislation would arguably be valid health law enacted pursuant to 
the  province’s  general  health  jurisdiction.112 
This reasoning might be viewed as supporting the criminal law 
power for legislating with respect to communicable disease control. To 
be sure, public health is concerned with reducing public harm, and the 
measures taken with respect to individuals may be seen as ancillary to 
108  Braën, supra note 19 at 8.
109  [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 537 [Morgentaler cited to S.C.R.].
110  Ibid. at 505.
111  Ibid. at 512. 
112  Ibid. at 491.
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that broader public purpose. However, the “public interest” and “public 
harm”  referred  to  by  Sopinka  J.  in  that  case  reflected  the  deeply  moral  
nature of the abortion debate. Infectious disease, on the other hand, does 
not generally include an element of morality. The public interest in con-
trolling disease is not only much clearer and less controversial in in-
fectious disease, but the public interest of safeguarding the community 
could  be  argued  to  fit  squarely  within  the  provincial  concerns  under  s.  
92(16).
In Schneider, the Court found British Columbia’s Heroin Treatment 
Act  to  be  within  the  jurisdiction  conferred  by  s.  92(16).  For  Dickson  J.,  
it  was  an   important  finding   that  heroin  addiction  had  not   reached   the  
level of national concern, and furthermore, he found that the failure by 
one province to provide adequate treatment programs would not result 
in harm to the other provinces.113   Instead,   in  adopting   the  findings  of  
an earlier report he held that “narcotic addiction is […] a physiological 
condition necessitating both medical and social intervention. This inter-
vention is necessarily provincial.”114 
With respect to infectious disease control, the potential for extra-pro-
vincial  harm  is  very  real.  Thus,  the  dialogue  of  a  jurisdictional  dispute  is  
likely to amount to “national concern” versus “local and private matter.” 
However,  the  provinces  have  the  benefit  of  strong  conceptual  arguments  
under s. 92(16). The communicable nature of a disease should not be 
permitted to obscure the fact that the disease still exists at the level of 
the individual, and that it is combated in part by medical intervention 
on an individual basis. While in public health law the concern for the 
individual is frequently subordinated to the concern for community wel-
fare, such subordination in constitutional law should be less tolerable, 
and  even  suspect.  To  deny  legislative  jurisdiction  from  the  province  be-
cause  an  individual  is  being  treated  or  quarantined  for  the  benefit  of  the  
community would undermine our conception of dignity and would fur-
ther disenfranchise the individual from their community. It would also 
deny the reality of our health care system; individuals are treated by our 
health system as ends in themselves, even where certain measures taken 
in respect of an individual will serve a utilitarian purpose. Despite the 
measures imposed upon the infected individual, they are still afforded 
113  Schneider, supra note 6 at 131-32. 
114  Supra note 6 at 131.
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procedural protections and rights, and are provided with medical serv-
ices  specific  to  their  needs.
An outbreak of disease may quickly escalate into more than a mere-
ly local matter. However, as discussed above, the management of an 
outbreak is perhaps best addressed by the locality, whether in the early 
stages  outbreak  or  during  a  widespread  epidemic.  The  fact  that  inter-­ju-
risdictional cooperation is very desirable in such an emergency should 
not detract from the reality that local public health units will be called 
upon  to  provide  the  first  line  of  defence,  even  if  they  are  asked  to  do  so  
in accordance with nationally-designed standards of practice. 
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC 
HEALTH
The SARS crisis of 2003 provided a long overdue wake-up call. Al-
though the Canadian experience was primarily localized within one 
province,  jurisdictional  issues  arose  nonetheless.  For  example,  when  it  
came to personal health information, municipalities, the province of On-
tario and Health Canada disagreed as to the obligations and constraints 
upon each level of government when it came to sharing that information 
with the others. 
A robust public health system requires a concerted national effort. 
But   national   effort   does   not   necessarily   mean   federal   jurisdiction;;   it  
requires cooperation and leadership. The federal government, through 
PHAC and the PCPHN, can employ cooperative approaches in address-
ing the problems within the existing provincial public health frame-
work. Some of these problems may result from differences among the 
provincial approaches to public health, and others may be the result of 
confusion  over  jurisdiction  (as  seen  with  the  SARS  example  in  the  con-
text of information sharing). 
When it comes to activities such as the reporting and sharing of 
public health information (such as personal health information), federal 
jurisdiction  may  be  required  by  the  National  Concern  branch  of  POGG  
to ensure that the PHAC can effectively identify threats, track the evolu-
tion of outbreaks, coordinate a national response, share meaningful data 
with the international community and provide accurate and comprehen-
sive surveillance data for conducting public health research. But when 
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it comes to other public health activities – those related directly to pre-
vention, control and management of communicable disease – inter-pro-
vincial  differences  in  approach  may  not  always  be  fatal  to  the  efficacy  
of  larger  public  health  efforts.  More  significantly,  these  differences  are  
illustrative of an important but unwritten constitutional principle – that 
of democracy.
Notwithstanding  the  strong  arguments  for  federal  jurisdiction,  per-
haps the best counter-argument is as follows. The ability of local govern-
ment to identify and respond to the needs of its community is unmatched 
by the federal government. This argument is particularly applicable to 
public health practice where the interests, autonomy and liberty of the 
individual must be reconciled with the collective interest of their local 
community.  The  practical  benefits  of  local  jurisdiction  in  the  American  
context have been noted: 
States and localities are closer to the people and understand better 
threats to their health. Because they are closer to the community, 
they can adapt prevention strategies to meet the needs of localities. 
States also are better placed to ‘experiment’ with solutions to 
complex health problems. By permitting states to act as laboratories 
for innovative health policies, the federalist system can, in theory, 
sort out effective from less effective interventions.115 
The conceptual appeal of this approach was also articulated in the Row-
ell-Sirois Report and, seventy years later, there is no reason to believe 
that these observations no longer apply: 
[T]here are pronounced regional differences in Canada in social 
philosophy which are bound to affect public health legislation. 
Centralization   of   jurisdiction   might   not,   therefore,   conduce  
to progressive action in public health or to national unity in 
general.116
The holdings in Rio Hotel Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing 
Board)117 and Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General)118 show a will-
115  Lawrence O. Gostin, “Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional 
Design” (2001) 11 Health Matrix 265 at 287.
116  Rowell-Sirois Report, supra note 21 at 34.
117  [1987] 2 S.C.R. 59, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 663 [Rio Hotel cited to S.C.R.].
118  [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 90 [Siemens cited to S.C.R.].
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ingness by the Supreme Court to uphold the role of local governments 
in responding to regional “social philosophy,” even if the response ap-
pears to encroach upon the federal criminal law power. In Rio Hotel, 
New Brunswick had enacted legislation regulating nude entertainment 
in establishments licensed to serve alcohol. Rio challenged the law as an 
attempt to legislate morality, thereby making it criminal law. To be sure, 
the Criminal Code  includes  prohibitions  similar  subject  matter  as  was  
dealt with by the provincial legislation. In holding the law to be a valid 
exercise of provincial power under ss. 92(13) and 92(16), the Court as-
signed   it   a   very   narrow  purpose,   finding   that   it  was   simply   aimed   at  
regulating the forms of entertainment which licensed establishments 
could use in their marketing efforts.119 While the reasons do not directly 
address the democratic importance of allowing provinces to legislate 
under   s.   92(16)   in   a  way  which   reflects   the  values  of   the   local   com-
munity,  such  reasoning  can  be  inferred  from  the  majority’s  decision  to  
uphold the law under the non-controversial licensing power in s. 92(13) 
when there was clearly a deeper thread of morality running through the 
legislation. 
Similarly, in Siemens, the Supreme Court upheld provincial legisla-
tion allowing for binding municipal plebiscites with respect to banning 
Video Lottery Terminals (VLTs), despite the fact that gaming is also 
a matter addressed under the Criminal Code.  Major  J.,  writing  for  the  
Court, held that:
[T]he purpose of the VLT Act as a whole seems to be, quite 
simply, to allow municipalities to express, by binding plebiscite, 
whether they wish VLTs to be permitted or prohibited within their 
communities,120 
and that such a purpose was intra vires the province, again under ss. 
92(13) and 92(16).  The Court held that there were many valid reasons 
for which a municipality might wish to ban VLTs, and even if moral 
considerations arise in these reasons, this will not invalidate the law and 
render it criminal in nature.121 
119  Rio Hotel, supra note 117 at 65.
120  Siemens, supra note 118 at 21.
121  Supra note 118 at 25.
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CONCLUSION
As discussed above, infectious disease control is not concerned with mo-
rality. But the reasons in Rio Hotel and Siemens are nonetheless appli-
cable here. In short, local needs, values and customs will often elude the 
federal government, which does not have an effective means of identify-
ing these local needs and responding to them. In contrast, the local and 
provincial governments are likely to be seized of such mechanisms and 
therefore must be accorded deference in their legislative decisions, even 
if  they  appear  to  be  addressing  an  otherwise  federal  subject  matter.
Granted, sometimes these local needs, values and customs will 
be  immaterial   to   the  exercise  of  proper   jurisdiction.  For  example,   the  
criminal law will apply without exception across Canada; one province 
cannot amend certain provisions as applied to them because their local 
culture  is  in  disagreement  with  the  federal  approach.  But  when  a  subject  
matter not only implicates provincial heads of power but plays heav-
ily upon these local values, there is excellent reason to leave primary 
jurisdiction  with  the  provinces,  despite  the  strength  of  arguments  under  
federal powers such as POGG or the criminal law.
In extreme cases, such as where one province fails to act altogether 
in  respect  of  a  public  health  emergency,  federal  jurisdiction  may  be  re-
quired if only on a temporary basis. But with respect to regional dif-
ferences in public health legislation, such differences should not be 
dogmatically   impugned   and   subjected   to   standardization.  Differences  
in approach do not suggest that provinces have abdicated their respon-
sibility or in any way compromised their ability to protect the health 
of their citizenry. On the contrary, the very fact of these differences 
suggests that provincial and municipal governments have acted based 
on   the  needs  and  values  of   their  communities,   thereby   fulfilling   their  
responsibility to protect health and, at the same time, preserving local 
democracy and the relationship between an individual and their local 
community.  In  assessing  arguments  for  federal  jurisdiction  over  public  
health, the unique position and abilities of the other governments must 
be kept at the forefront of the discussion. Such an approach will likely 
conclude that in all but extreme circumstances, the provinces must not 
be  divested  of  primary  jurisdiction  over  public  health.  
